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Asiana to proceed with TV station suit -- but NTSB off the hook
Seoul, South Korea (CNN) -- Asiana Airlines says it will proceed with its planned lawsuit against an Oakland, California, television station -- but it's not going to pursue legal action against the National Transportation Safety Board. Over the weekend, the Korean airlines had said it would sue both entities after an intern at the NTSB mistakenly confirmed "inaccurate and offensive" names as those of the pilots of ill-fated Flight 214. (www.cnn.com) Mehr...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Yes, right you are. Like I have been saying repeatedly, during the times of introduction of 'automation' EVERY training was supposed to include the manual operation as an emergency maneuver. Last minute take over command by humans from Mr. Computer.
Ways will have to be found to insist on training on manual operation and acquire HIGH degree of dexterity.
Ways will have to be found to insist on training on manual operation and acquire HIGH degree of dexterity.
" damaged the reputation of the pilots and the airline ".......I would have thought the sight of a totally destroyed near new B 777 would not have done too much to enhance the reputation of the pilots and/or the airline. Early investigation results suggest it looks like pilot error and smells like pilot error....not too sure how muck lower the public perception of both pilots and the airline could go at the moment. As an aside, can the FAA impose any restrictions on Airlines flying into the US where it can be proven that the quality of the pilot "training" is simply not up to the standard expected ?
The FAA/ federal government can impose whatever restrictions it wants. All foreign nationals coming into the country legally are let in by the Feds ( including terrorists, subversives, criminals, pilots, etc).
They were so, so close to having a smooth uneventful landing.
Had they come in at 2400 at DUYET (that would be 600fy above the GS),, they may have glided all the way in with engines idling and a descent rate of about 400 per nm, stalling only after pulling up the nose to put the main landing gear down on the runway. If you're going to run out of go, it would be awesome to have it happen right when you planned to put down the aircraft.
If they had passed DUYET at the prescribed 1800, an descended at 300ft per nm. This descent rate needs more power than idling engines provide. So they would've noticed the decaying airspeed and altitude much sooner. A minute earlier yet would've either fixed their approach or gone around. On the seond approach they wouldn't have not noticed the airspeed, altitude, and autothrottles. They'd be hyperaware because of having missed the auto throttle setting on the first approach. The instructor might've even made it into an important learning moment. Nit only remembering it for future check rides, but fir his own flying as well.
As it is, they made alternations in their approach in the last minute. The new approach configuration was unstable without power (idling engines). They were too close to the ground. If they didn't notice in the first few seconds, it would e too late to recover before a crash. The rest is history.
If either pilot had noticed the decaying speed or altitude 15 seconds earlier or more,and done something about it right away, they might've still been able to have a likely smooth landing. At least a pilot, who puts his aircraft down manually on a regular basis would've.
My point is the difference between smooth landing and tragic crash come don to only seconds. How many flights come down just barely on the untragic side of those seconds. Hoe many pilots have 'oh shit' moments, and are sonlad to just barely make it through without an ugly incident.
These guys may not be significantly worse than most of their colleagues. Remember, at the end of a 10-hour flight, they missed a crucial aspect of their professional duties and were only 15-30 seconds late in noticing, but it was the wrong 15-30 seconds to not monitor airspeed and altitude. I get the impression that at any other time in the flight these two would've been able to get their plane and themselves out of that pickle. The laws of physics just didn't allow it. At the moment they finally noticed, it was too late.
It would be wrong to only single out these guys for their unforgivable mistake, and not take steps to help their colleagues avoid a potential similar incident in the future.
BTW At the time of the crash, the ILS had been out for weeks and was scheduled to be out until August.
Turning off other functioning ILS systems may uncover another set of pilots who crash tbeir airplane. But that's no way to weed out bad pilots. A better alternative would be pilot training, coupled with company policy that facilitated the acquisition and maintenance of manual flying skills.
Had they come in at 2400 at DUYET (that would be 600fy above the GS),, they may have glided all the way in with engines idling and a descent rate of about 400 per nm, stalling only after pulling up the nose to put the main landing gear down on the runway. If you're going to run out of go, it would be awesome to have it happen right when you planned to put down the aircraft.
If they had passed DUYET at the prescribed 1800, an descended at 300ft per nm. This descent rate needs more power than idling engines provide. So they would've noticed the decaying airspeed and altitude much sooner. A minute earlier yet would've either fixed their approach or gone around. On the seond approach they wouldn't have not noticed the airspeed, altitude, and autothrottles. They'd be hyperaware because of having missed the auto throttle setting on the first approach. The instructor might've even made it into an important learning moment. Nit only remembering it for future check rides, but fir his own flying as well.
As it is, they made alternations in their approach in the last minute. The new approach configuration was unstable without power (idling engines). They were too close to the ground. If they didn't notice in the first few seconds, it would e too late to recover before a crash. The rest is history.
If either pilot had noticed the decaying speed or altitude 15 seconds earlier or more,and done something about it right away, they might've still been able to have a likely smooth landing. At least a pilot, who puts his aircraft down manually on a regular basis would've.
My point is the difference between smooth landing and tragic crash come don to only seconds. How many flights come down just barely on the untragic side of those seconds. Hoe many pilots have 'oh shit' moments, and are sonlad to just barely make it through without an ugly incident.
These guys may not be significantly worse than most of their colleagues. Remember, at the end of a 10-hour flight, they missed a crucial aspect of their professional duties and were only 15-30 seconds late in noticing, but it was the wrong 15-30 seconds to not monitor airspeed and altitude. I get the impression that at any other time in the flight these two would've been able to get their plane and themselves out of that pickle. The laws of physics just didn't allow it. At the moment they finally noticed, it was too late.
It would be wrong to only single out these guys for their unforgivable mistake, and not take steps to help their colleagues avoid a potential similar incident in the future.
BTW At the time of the crash, the ILS had been out for weeks and was scheduled to be out until August.
Turning off other functioning ILS systems may uncover another set of pilots who crash tbeir airplane. But that's no way to weed out bad pilots. A better alternative would be pilot training, coupled with company policy that facilitated the acquisition and maintenance of manual flying skills.
Dear Friend, sorry for repeating a question or observation. The ILS at SFO was not working for weeks. Yet pilots flying ALL kinds of aircrafts were successfully landing. Again, pilots of even Asiana 214, a daily flight, had been landing B777 TILL 5th July safely. Knowing that SFO is a fairly busy terminal, even some flights must have landed minutes before this particular aircraft on the same runway.
Why and how?
So what was so different at that fateful precise moment for this specific aircraft?
Why and how?
So what was so different at that fateful precise moment for this specific aircraft?
P.S. - Thus one can not find fault with the training system at Asiana nor the attitudanl error of the Koreans/Orientals/Asians!
How can you not fault the training system when the trainers them selves said that they do not like to do manual flying and it is not one of their larger subjects (reworded, same comment). How can you have a training department that does not teach how to land and takeoff proficiently in any and all a/c that they actively fly. The training department screwed up, and ALL of their pilots should be grounded until more simulator time with LOTS of hands on flying.... PERIOD.
I'd have to agree with sparkie.
It's not a problem unique to the Korean carriers, though is certainly present there.
In Korea the problem stems from hiring pilots without prior experience (fast growth airline growth rates and no large pool of GA pilots to hire from in their country). Then they train them to be systems monitors, rather than pilots. No problem if everything goes right. Unfortunately, everything can go to crap really fast. Then the problem is exacerbated with socially influenced CRM deficiency and their social difficulty in pointing out mistakes of a superior, which is an essential aspect of cockpit communication.
It a similar problem that you'll see at many airlines that have all or mostly Airbus equipment. The pilots develop the mindset of system monitors and forget to be pilots.
The Airbus is built more for automation and system monitors. Even Boeings come with lots of automation. Automation is good when you need it (eg at cruising altitude or landing in conditions) but the cockpit is built for flying.
The Airbus is built with a different philosophy. While the planes are sturdy (with possible exception of the A300), their cockpits come with joysticks rather than yokes. That shows the lower priority that Airbus engineers give to piloting (vs systems monitoring).
I still think it would be great for Korean pilots to take a few weeks (paid by their company or on their own dime) to travel to US and hand fly small C172s without any glass. Actually learning real piloting would do wonders for their situational awareness in unexpected circumstances, where the pilot's ability to think clearly will be most important.
The French AirFrance 447 pilot would not have stalled his plane from all the way from FL350 into the ocean, if he were a pilot and not just a systems monitor. A bunch of real stall exercises in a Cessna with just him and an instructor would've given him the confidence to take more appropriate action the airliner.
If the Korean pilots of Asiana 214 regurly hand flew planes (no matter if Cessnas, 777s, or A320), they would've have forgotten to monitor airspeed and altitude on final.
Piloting skills ate still important for pilots. not in spite of automation but because of it. Automation is great but not perfect. When something goes wrong, I want pilots in the front that know more than plane and who have better cognitive skills than the plane and have better flying skills than the plane.
It's not a problem unique to the Korean carriers, though is certainly present there.
In Korea the problem stems from hiring pilots without prior experience (fast growth airline growth rates and no large pool of GA pilots to hire from in their country). Then they train them to be systems monitors, rather than pilots. No problem if everything goes right. Unfortunately, everything can go to crap really fast. Then the problem is exacerbated with socially influenced CRM deficiency and their social difficulty in pointing out mistakes of a superior, which is an essential aspect of cockpit communication.
It a similar problem that you'll see at many airlines that have all or mostly Airbus equipment. The pilots develop the mindset of system monitors and forget to be pilots.
The Airbus is built more for automation and system monitors. Even Boeings come with lots of automation. Automation is good when you need it (eg at cruising altitude or landing in conditions) but the cockpit is built for flying.
The Airbus is built with a different philosophy. While the planes are sturdy (with possible exception of the A300), their cockpits come with joysticks rather than yokes. That shows the lower priority that Airbus engineers give to piloting (vs systems monitoring).
I still think it would be great for Korean pilots to take a few weeks (paid by their company or on their own dime) to travel to US and hand fly small C172s without any glass. Actually learning real piloting would do wonders for their situational awareness in unexpected circumstances, where the pilot's ability to think clearly will be most important.
The French AirFrance 447 pilot would not have stalled his plane from all the way from FL350 into the ocean, if he were a pilot and not just a systems monitor. A bunch of real stall exercises in a Cessna with just him and an instructor would've given him the confidence to take more appropriate action the airliner.
If the Korean pilots of Asiana 214 regurly hand flew planes (no matter if Cessnas, 777s, or A320), they would've have forgotten to monitor airspeed and altitude on final.
Piloting skills ate still important for pilots. not in spite of automation but because of it. Automation is great but not perfect. When something goes wrong, I want pilots in the front that know more than plane and who have better cognitive skills than the plane and have better flying skills than the plane.
So the question is not whether there is pilot training, but what is being taught specifically and differing philosophies on aircraft piloting in general. For example there is a debate about whether pilots should need to have manual flying skills or whether they should just be better systems managers. Some piloting philosophies believe that automation is better at piloting planes than humans so it leads to teaching different skills than under a philosophy of the human piloting the plane with automation as a tool available for certain operations.
So you first have to get the pilots and their trainers to agree that being able to pilot a plane by hand is important. Whether in the case of automation failure, or to have situational awareness to not let the automation crash the plane and/or not crash the plane when the plane feedback goes against basic piloting fundamentals.