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The pipeline of new airline pilots appears to be drying up for many reasons – reasons ranging from the high cost of flight training versus the perceived career payoff, to the increased flight experience required as a result of new federal regulations. Either way, a shortage of pilots at regional airlines yields significant consequence on the major airlines they operate for. As the regionals reduce the amount of aircraft they can operate due to staffing shortfalls, their major airline counterparts ultimately lose valuable passenger feed. Throw irregular operational events such as snowstorms into the mix, and an already struggling operation is quickly crippled. Clearly change is needed before it’s too late.
Fortunately, the industry may be adapting to its struggles in a way that compliments the cyclical nature of the airline business. Present day industry trends that point to past practices appear to address the pilot shortage issue by default. If we briefly review a timeline of airline history, cycles of an abundance of airline brands followed by periods of industry consolidation become apparent. For example, in the 1980’s we saw People Express, New York Air, and Frontier Airlines all merge into Continental Airlines. In the same decade, PSA and Piedmont Airlines merged into US Air. Before we knew it, the legacy airline landscape was comprised of United, American, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, and Continental Airlines. Proving the cycle once again, recent merger activity has yielded only three remaining legacy U.S. airlines - American, United, and Delta.
The past 20 years has also seen a spawn of numerous regional airlines doing business as (DBA) the major airline counterpart whom they hold a contract with. By outsourcing their regional jet flying needs, major airlines have realized significant cost advantages by leveraging the competition between multiple regional carriers who underbid one another to win a proposed flying contract. To be competitively positioned, regional carriers maintain the lowest cost structure possible, most notably through extremely low employee compensation.
When the regional jet first surfaced in the late 1990’s, the economics of cheaper fuel allowed the skies to be littered with smaller, yet profitable 50-seat jet aircraft. The use of these jets allowed for increased frequency between city pairs with the same speed and similar range of larger aircraft that couldn’t support such a strategy in certain markets. Today however, higher fuel costs have drastically changed the viability of such a business model – a model that is now changing.
Coincidentally, in a time when these smaller jets aren’t economically viable (arguably they haven’t been for quite some time), the ability to find the pilots to fly them is also failing. The current industry response is a feverish replacement of outgoing 50-seaters with larger 76 -100 seat regional aircraft, however not on a one-for-one basis. What we’re seeing is an overall reduction in regional airline size as the result of a shrinking fleet. In fact, many of the larger regional aircraft are finding their way back onto major airline fleets as a result of pilot union/airline management negotiations. The result of this trend is a long-term view of overall smaller regional carriers that will ultimately require fewer pilots. This new model won’t develop overnight, rather over the course of the coming years, but one can see how the aforementioned pilot void may shrink.
How might these changes affect the paying passenger? I think the overall outlook for the customer is a positive one. For starters, as the retiring smaller aircraft are replaced with larger ones on a less than one-for-one basis, overall there will be less aircraft in the skies. This of course leads to alleviated airspace and airport congestion, which equals fewer delays. On the other hand, smaller aircraft allow for more frequent flights between city pairs - a plus for the flexibility needs of a business traveler. Larger regional aircraft may reduce that frequency but still allow for similar cumulative seating capacity, with the added bonus of a first class cabin. As an example, instead of five flights a day between cities on a 50-seater, perhaps three or four flights on a 76-seater will result. The overall passengers carried will be roughly the same – only on fewer available flights, but in more comfort.
The cycle of the ever-adapting airline industry tends to repair it’s own problems in many ways. There is certainly current-day proof that air service is being restricted due to the effect of a shrinking pilot supply, and it will likely get worse before it gets better. These are highly dynamic times in the airline business, and reverting back to what once was may indeed brighten the outlook.
The Changing Dynamic of Regional Airlines
It’s no secret that regional airlines are struggling to backfill outgoing pilots. As the baby-boomer generation of major airline pilots encroaches on the mandatory age-65 retirement point, experienced pilots from regional carriers are quickly being hired to fill their shoes. The result is a desperate need at the regional level to fill the void with a new generation of airline pilots – a void that is only getting wider. But can we expect the problem to spiral out of control, or is the airline industry evolving in a way that counteracts it?The pipeline of new airline pilots appears to be drying up for many reasons – reasons ranging from the high cost of flight training versus the perceived career payoff, to the increased flight experience required as a result of new federal regulations. Either way, a shortage of pilots at regional airlines yields significant consequence on the major airlines they operate for. As the regionals reduce the amount of aircraft they can operate due to staffing shortfalls, their major airline counterparts ultimately lose valuable passenger feed. Throw irregular operational events such as snowstorms into the mix, and an already struggling operation is quickly crippled. Clearly change is needed before it’s too late.
Fortunately, the industry may be adapting to its struggles in a way that compliments the cyclical nature of the airline business. Present day industry trends that point to past practices appear to address the pilot shortage issue by default. If we briefly review a timeline of airline history, cycles of an abundance of airline brands followed by periods of industry consolidation become apparent. For example, in the 1980’s we saw People Express, New York Air, and Frontier Airlines all merge into Continental Airlines. In the same decade, PSA and Piedmont Airlines merged into US Air. Before we knew it, the legacy airline landscape was comprised of United, American, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, and Continental Airlines. Proving the cycle once again, recent merger activity has yielded only three remaining legacy U.S. airlines - American, United, and Delta.
The past 20 years has also seen a spawn of numerous regional airlines doing business as (DBA) the major airline counterpart whom they hold a contract with. By outsourcing their regional jet flying needs, major airlines have realized significant cost advantages by leveraging the competition between multiple regional carriers who underbid one another to win a proposed flying contract. To be competitively positioned, regional carriers maintain the lowest cost structure possible, most notably through extremely low employee compensation.
When the regional jet first surfaced in the late 1990’s, the economics of cheaper fuel allowed the skies to be littered with smaller, yet profitable 50-seat jet aircraft. The use of these jets allowed for increased frequency between city pairs with the same speed and similar range of larger aircraft that couldn’t support such a strategy in certain markets. Today however, higher fuel costs have drastically changed the viability of such a business model – a model that is now changing.
Coincidentally, in a time when these smaller jets aren’t economically viable (arguably they haven’t been for quite some time), the ability to find the pilots to fly them is also failing. The current industry response is a feverish replacement of outgoing 50-seaters with larger 76 -100 seat regional aircraft, however not on a one-for-one basis. What we’re seeing is an overall reduction in regional airline size as the result of a shrinking fleet. In fact, many of the larger regional aircraft are finding their way back onto major airline fleets as a result of pilot union/airline management negotiations. The result of this trend is a long-term view of overall smaller regional carriers that will ultimately require fewer pilots. This new model won’t develop overnight, rather over the course of the coming years, but one can see how the aforementioned pilot void may shrink.
How might these changes affect the paying passenger? I think the overall outlook for the customer is a positive one. For starters, as the retiring smaller aircraft are replaced with larger ones on a less than one-for-one basis, overall there will be less aircraft in the skies. This of course leads to alleviated airspace and airport congestion, which equals fewer delays. On the other hand, smaller aircraft allow for more frequent flights between city pairs - a plus for the flexibility needs of a business traveler. Larger regional aircraft may reduce that frequency but still allow for similar cumulative seating capacity, with the added bonus of a first class cabin. As an example, instead of five flights a day between cities on a 50-seater, perhaps three or four flights on a 76-seater will result. The overall passengers carried will be roughly the same – only on fewer available flights, but in more comfort.
The cycle of the ever-adapting airline industry tends to repair it’s own problems in many ways. There is certainly current-day proof that air service is being restricted due to the effect of a shrinking pilot supply, and it will likely get worse before it gets better. These are highly dynamic times in the airline business, and reverting back to what once was may indeed brighten the outlook.
Daniel Fahl Ständiger Mitarbeiter 
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You make a good point about the 91/135. There are some good ones out there and young pilots will have to have a reality check, $ wise, when 1500 hours are attained. Lots of those 91/135 gigs are paying well above starting regional pay and flying big iron as well, and that is what it is all about, or should be. As we expanded last year and my time wound down, I hired 5 pilots. Of course they were all well experienced but even the youngest started at $60k, the more senior above $100k but they are all now typed on a 767, CRJ200 and a KA90gti.We are chartered 135 but it basically is a 91 as we strictly corporate fly but have done some outside under contract. Point is, that reality check will come along. It did for me in 73. A young man or woman should not be so single minded that they miss it.
there is a simple solution, and most logical in capitalism: pay more.
Shortage is suppose to raise price
Shortage is suppose to raise price
Price paid will almost certainly go up.
But completely separately from the cost of labor, there may be a lag period while pilots with lower hours build up their flying time to 1500.
Ex-pat pilots flying overseas for a premium will often not be willing to fly for wages that regional airlines can afford to pay. Newer regional jets are increasing in seat capacity, but fleet averages are quite low compared to mainline fleets.
The reason for the existence of regional airlines flying affiliate feeder routes for mainline is to save money/ reduce costs. Mainline airlines could not easily provide such a cast network without the regionals. The mainline planes too large and the mainline pilots too expensive to profitably provide service to smaller markets. Even with the lower wages paid to regional pilots, most major airlines' short haul business is their least profitable. For many, these services lose money, and are subsidized by the long haul business, whose routes are partially filled by feeder traffic from these regional flights.
So yes, cost of pilots will go up. But service to some markets will be reduced or eliminated altogether, as the costs of providing those services increases.
Those airlines that are able to adapt to market realities the quickest (and/or that are least restricted by artificial agreements/ restrictions) will provide the best service at the best prices and be most profitable. Those airlines with the greatest restrictions will continue to bleed cash in short haul. They will continue to pay regional pilots poorly and will have trouble filling out their short haul flights with crews. Some may even go out of business, getting caught between better run and more profitable LCC's in short haul, and more agressive international airlines with better service and mire extensive networks in long haul.
So maybe not so simple as it seems.
The irony is that some labor agreements that make regional services less profitable on purpose may put the mainline airline at a competitive disadvantage. The irony is that these profit restrictions that are put in place supposedly to protect mainline pilot jobs may kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. That is, the mainline airline can be forced to close or be bankrupted by the financial pressure from these agreement. These can ironically result in loss of mainline pilot jobs and labor concessations, respectively.
But completely separately from the cost of labor, there may be a lag period while pilots with lower hours build up their flying time to 1500.
Ex-pat pilots flying overseas for a premium will often not be willing to fly for wages that regional airlines can afford to pay. Newer regional jets are increasing in seat capacity, but fleet averages are quite low compared to mainline fleets.
The reason for the existence of regional airlines flying affiliate feeder routes for mainline is to save money/ reduce costs. Mainline airlines could not easily provide such a cast network without the regionals. The mainline planes too large and the mainline pilots too expensive to profitably provide service to smaller markets. Even with the lower wages paid to regional pilots, most major airlines' short haul business is their least profitable. For many, these services lose money, and are subsidized by the long haul business, whose routes are partially filled by feeder traffic from these regional flights.
So yes, cost of pilots will go up. But service to some markets will be reduced or eliminated altogether, as the costs of providing those services increases.
Those airlines that are able to adapt to market realities the quickest (and/or that are least restricted by artificial agreements/ restrictions) will provide the best service at the best prices and be most profitable. Those airlines with the greatest restrictions will continue to bleed cash in short haul. They will continue to pay regional pilots poorly and will have trouble filling out their short haul flights with crews. Some may even go out of business, getting caught between better run and more profitable LCC's in short haul, and more agressive international airlines with better service and mire extensive networks in long haul.
So maybe not so simple as it seems.
The irony is that some labor agreements that make regional services less profitable on purpose may put the mainline airline at a competitive disadvantage. The irony is that these profit restrictions that are put in place supposedly to protect mainline pilot jobs may kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. That is, the mainline airline can be forced to close or be bankrupted by the financial pressure from these agreement. These can ironically result in loss of mainline pilot jobs and labor concessations, respectively.
One potential issue that may arise is the elimination of small cities.
We may see places like Grand Rapids,MI, Hattiesburg, MS or Manchester, NH lose all scheduled service.
Maybe that is not such a bad thing. One, that would clear up a lot of clutter in the skies. Two, these federal subsidies we taxpayers are saddled with to keep those airports open for commercial traffic would go away.
If the carriers cannot find the drivers for the planes, something has got to go.
We may see places like Grand Rapids,MI, Hattiesburg, MS or Manchester, NH lose all scheduled service.
Maybe that is not such a bad thing. One, that would clear up a lot of clutter in the skies. Two, these federal subsidies we taxpayers are saddled with to keep those airports open for commercial traffic would go away.
If the carriers cannot find the drivers for the planes, something has got to go.
Agree to a point. If they have the gov't subsidy now, it won't go away and with the money, the airlines will stay after it. BTW, good to see you on, that crash over by Houston the other day said the plane was out of Austin and I thought of you. Did you know that guy?
You are on the right track, but the "pilot" issue is not the only thing causing the lose of service to smaller airports.
There are essentially only four major airlines left that control about 90% of the domestic passenger capacity--American, United, Delta and Southwest. All the other airlines added up account for 10%--that's right-Jetblue, Alaska, Spirit, etc. The four big airlines no longer have the incentive to hire regional airlines to serve smaller cities to capture traffic for their networks. The remaining four big airline serve the big cities and essentially have a 25% chance of getting a passenger to fly on them. In the old days, they could use a 19-seat operator to serve a small city where there might only be two carriers competing for the traffic thereby having a 50% chance of getting that passenger to enter their network. This was a major advantage because when there where 8 large airlines at the big airports there was only a 12.5% chance of capturing the traffic. The cost of operating a 19/30-seat to small markets was worth it.
But with limited competition and fuel now at $3.50 per gallon, the best bet for the majors is to fly big airplanes between big airports and have passengers show up on buses. Fares can be kept lower on aircraft with more seats. And, it takes two pilot to fly a B737-900--same as a 30-seat SAAB. If your city is served by a carrier with less then four 30/50-seat turboprops flight per day expect that airline to drop your city. At least with six 50-seat flights you can consolidate those trips onto 3 ERJ-175 flights and cover the morning, afternoon and evening. With only four trips, two departures on bigger aircraft make it difficult to cover the peak travel times during the day.
This is why I think high-end/time sensitive business travelers to/from small cities will wind up on fractional jets/turboprops. Price sensitive travelers will be on the bus to the hub.
There are essentially only four major airlines left that control about 90% of the domestic passenger capacity--American, United, Delta and Southwest. All the other airlines added up account for 10%--that's right-Jetblue, Alaska, Spirit, etc. The four big airlines no longer have the incentive to hire regional airlines to serve smaller cities to capture traffic for their networks. The remaining four big airline serve the big cities and essentially have a 25% chance of getting a passenger to fly on them. In the old days, they could use a 19-seat operator to serve a small city where there might only be two carriers competing for the traffic thereby having a 50% chance of getting that passenger to enter their network. This was a major advantage because when there where 8 large airlines at the big airports there was only a 12.5% chance of capturing the traffic. The cost of operating a 19/30-seat to small markets was worth it.
But with limited competition and fuel now at $3.50 per gallon, the best bet for the majors is to fly big airplanes between big airports and have passengers show up on buses. Fares can be kept lower on aircraft with more seats. And, it takes two pilot to fly a B737-900--same as a 30-seat SAAB. If your city is served by a carrier with less then four 30/50-seat turboprops flight per day expect that airline to drop your city. At least with six 50-seat flights you can consolidate those trips onto 3 ERJ-175 flights and cover the morning, afternoon and evening. With only four trips, two departures on bigger aircraft make it difficult to cover the peak travel times during the day.
This is why I think high-end/time sensitive business travelers to/from small cities will wind up on fractional jets/turboprops. Price sensitive travelers will be on the bus to the hub.
As to the topic of 91/135 flying. That world is not big enough nor busy enough to support the influx of pilots looking to build time. Unless you get on with a busy 135 operator which would require many hours to start with, building the required time takes years of flying. On demand is the key word here, no demand, no flying. Once you have the required hours, would you want to leave your much higher paying 91 gig, to go make 50-70% less to go fly for a regional? The decision is yours. There are some pilots whose only goal is to make it to a mainline and great for them. Reality is, life will dictate what you can do and what you want to do.
Agree with Rory, the price for a college flight degree is terrible. Many other options are out there. Most if not all operators are looking for a degree, period. Could be a business degree, biology, accounting et. Go to a "mom and pop" or other flight school and learn to fly. A commercial license from a college trained pilot looks exactly the same as a commercial license from another training outlet.
My advice for people who want to be a pilot, go for it. Do not listen to ALL the negatives and do not listen to ALL the positives. But, do get an education in something else besides flying. Have a back up plan. An aviation degree gets one thing in life, a business or other degree opens up much, much more to you in life. As you can tell, that is something I have though about on late nights in the seat.
Side note, I recently learned that a major store is so short on pharmacists, they offer 120K to start and car lease to fresh graduates. Now THAT is the way to solve your shortage! I'm waiting by my phone for Envoy to call...any minute now...