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Asiana to proceed with TV station suit -- but NTSB off the hook
Seoul, South Korea (CNN) -- Asiana Airlines says it will proceed with its planned lawsuit against an Oakland, California, television station -- but it's not going to pursue legal action against the National Transportation Safety Board. Over the weekend, the Korean airlines had said it would sue both entities after an intern at the NTSB mistakenly confirmed "inaccurate and offensive" names as those of the pilots of ill-fated Flight 214. (www.cnn.com) Mehr...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Yes, right you are. Like I have been saying repeatedly, during the times of introduction of 'automation' EVERY training was supposed to include the manual operation as an emergency maneuver. Last minute take over command by humans from Mr. Computer.
Ways will have to be found to insist on training on manual operation and acquire HIGH degree of dexterity.
Ways will have to be found to insist on training on manual operation and acquire HIGH degree of dexterity.
" damaged the reputation of the pilots and the airline ".......I would have thought the sight of a totally destroyed near new B 777 would not have done too much to enhance the reputation of the pilots and/or the airline. Early investigation results suggest it looks like pilot error and smells like pilot error....not too sure how muck lower the public perception of both pilots and the airline could go at the moment. As an aside, can the FAA impose any restrictions on Airlines flying into the US where it can be proven that the quality of the pilot "training" is simply not up to the standard expected ?
The FAA/ federal government can impose whatever restrictions it wants. All foreign nationals coming into the country legally are let in by the Feds ( including terrorists, subversives, criminals, pilots, etc).
They were so, so close to having a smooth uneventful landing.
Had they come in at 2400 at DUYET (that would be 600fy above the GS),, they may have glided all the way in with engines idling and a descent rate of about 400 per nm, stalling only after pulling up the nose to put the main landing gear down on the runway. If you're going to run out of go, it would be awesome to have it happen right when you planned to put down the aircraft.
If they had passed DUYET at the prescribed 1800, an descended at 300ft per nm. This descent rate needs more power than idling engines provide. So they would've noticed the decaying airspeed and altitude much sooner. A minute earlier yet would've either fixed their approach or gone around. On the seond approach they wouldn't have not noticed the airspeed, altitude, and autothrottles. They'd be hyperaware because of having missed the auto throttle setting on the first approach. The instructor might've even made it into an important learning moment. Nit only remembering it for future check rides, but fir his own flying as well.
As it is, they made alternations in their approach in the last minute. The new approach configuration was unstable without power (idling engines). They were too close to the ground. If they didn't notice in the first few seconds, it would e too late to recover before a crash. The rest is history.
If either pilot had noticed the decaying speed or altitude 15 seconds earlier or more,and done something about it right away, they might've still been able to have a likely smooth landing. At least a pilot, who puts his aircraft down manually on a regular basis would've.
My point is the difference between smooth landing and tragic crash come don to only seconds. How many flights come down just barely on the untragic side of those seconds. Hoe many pilots have 'oh shit' moments, and are sonlad to just barely make it through without an ugly incident.
These guys may not be significantly worse than most of their colleagues. Remember, at the end of a 10-hour flight, they missed a crucial aspect of their professional duties and were only 15-30 seconds late in noticing, but it was the wrong 15-30 seconds to not monitor airspeed and altitude. I get the impression that at any other time in the flight these two would've been able to get their plane and themselves out of that pickle. The laws of physics just didn't allow it. At the moment they finally noticed, it was too late.
It would be wrong to only single out these guys for their unforgivable mistake, and not take steps to help their colleagues avoid a potential similar incident in the future.
BTW At the time of the crash, the ILS had been out for weeks and was scheduled to be out until August.
Turning off other functioning ILS systems may uncover another set of pilots who crash tbeir airplane. But that's no way to weed out bad pilots. A better alternative would be pilot training, coupled with company policy that facilitated the acquisition and maintenance of manual flying skills.
Had they come in at 2400 at DUYET (that would be 600fy above the GS),, they may have glided all the way in with engines idling and a descent rate of about 400 per nm, stalling only after pulling up the nose to put the main landing gear down on the runway. If you're going to run out of go, it would be awesome to have it happen right when you planned to put down the aircraft.
If they had passed DUYET at the prescribed 1800, an descended at 300ft per nm. This descent rate needs more power than idling engines provide. So they would've noticed the decaying airspeed and altitude much sooner. A minute earlier yet would've either fixed their approach or gone around. On the seond approach they wouldn't have not noticed the airspeed, altitude, and autothrottles. They'd be hyperaware because of having missed the auto throttle setting on the first approach. The instructor might've even made it into an important learning moment. Nit only remembering it for future check rides, but fir his own flying as well.
As it is, they made alternations in their approach in the last minute. The new approach configuration was unstable without power (idling engines). They were too close to the ground. If they didn't notice in the first few seconds, it would e too late to recover before a crash. The rest is history.
If either pilot had noticed the decaying speed or altitude 15 seconds earlier or more,and done something about it right away, they might've still been able to have a likely smooth landing. At least a pilot, who puts his aircraft down manually on a regular basis would've.
My point is the difference between smooth landing and tragic crash come don to only seconds. How many flights come down just barely on the untragic side of those seconds. Hoe many pilots have 'oh shit' moments, and are sonlad to just barely make it through without an ugly incident.
These guys may not be significantly worse than most of their colleagues. Remember, at the end of a 10-hour flight, they missed a crucial aspect of their professional duties and were only 15-30 seconds late in noticing, but it was the wrong 15-30 seconds to not monitor airspeed and altitude. I get the impression that at any other time in the flight these two would've been able to get their plane and themselves out of that pickle. The laws of physics just didn't allow it. At the moment they finally noticed, it was too late.
It would be wrong to only single out these guys for their unforgivable mistake, and not take steps to help their colleagues avoid a potential similar incident in the future.
BTW At the time of the crash, the ILS had been out for weeks and was scheduled to be out until August.
Turning off other functioning ILS systems may uncover another set of pilots who crash tbeir airplane. But that's no way to weed out bad pilots. A better alternative would be pilot training, coupled with company policy that facilitated the acquisition and maintenance of manual flying skills.
Dear Friend, sorry for repeating a question or observation. The ILS at SFO was not working for weeks. Yet pilots flying ALL kinds of aircrafts were successfully landing. Again, pilots of even Asiana 214, a daily flight, had been landing B777 TILL 5th July safely. Knowing that SFO is a fairly busy terminal, even some flights must have landed minutes before this particular aircraft on the same runway.
Why and how?
So what was so different at that fateful precise moment for this specific aircraft?
Why and how?
So what was so different at that fateful precise moment for this specific aircraft?
P.S. - Thus one can not find fault with the training system at Asiana nor the attitudanl error of the Koreans/Orientals/Asians!
How can you not fault the training system when the trainers them selves said that they do not like to do manual flying and it is not one of their larger subjects (reworded, same comment). How can you have a training department that does not teach how to land and takeoff proficiently in any and all a/c that they actively fly. The training department screwed up, and ALL of their pilots should be grounded until more simulator time with LOTS of hands on flying.... PERIOD.
I'd have to agree with sparkie.
It's not a problem unique to the Korean carriers, though is certainly present there.
In Korea the problem stems from hiring pilots without prior experience (fast growth airline growth rates and no large pool of GA pilots to hire from in their country). Then they train them to be systems monitors, rather than pilots. No problem if everything goes right. Unfortunately, everything can go to crap really fast. Then the problem is exacerbated with socially influenced CRM deficiency and their social difficulty in pointing out mistakes of a superior, which is an essential aspect of cockpit communication.
It a similar problem that you'll see at many airlines that have all or mostly Airbus equipment. The pilots develop the mindset of system monitors and forget to be pilots.
The Airbus is built more for automation and system monitors. Even Boeings come with lots of automation. Automation is good when you need it (eg at cruising altitude or landing in conditions) but the cockpit is built for flying.
The Airbus is built with a different philosophy. While the planes are sturdy (with possible exception of the A300), their cockpits come with joysticks rather than yokes. That shows the lower priority that Airbus engineers give to piloting (vs systems monitoring).
I still think it would be great for Korean pilots to take a few weeks (paid by their company or on their own dime) to travel to US and hand fly small C172s without any glass. Actually learning real piloting would do wonders for their situational awareness in unexpected circumstances, where the pilot's ability to think clearly will be most important.
The French AirFrance 447 pilot would not have stalled his plane from all the way from FL350 into the ocean, if he were a pilot and not just a systems monitor. A bunch of real stall exercises in a Cessna with just him and an instructor would've given him the confidence to take more appropriate action the airliner.
If the Korean pilots of Asiana 214 regurly hand flew planes (no matter if Cessnas, 777s, or A320), they would've have forgotten to monitor airspeed and altitude on final.
Piloting skills ate still important for pilots. not in spite of automation but because of it. Automation is great but not perfect. When something goes wrong, I want pilots in the front that know more than plane and who have better cognitive skills than the plane and have better flying skills than the plane.
It's not a problem unique to the Korean carriers, though is certainly present there.
In Korea the problem stems from hiring pilots without prior experience (fast growth airline growth rates and no large pool of GA pilots to hire from in their country). Then they train them to be systems monitors, rather than pilots. No problem if everything goes right. Unfortunately, everything can go to crap really fast. Then the problem is exacerbated with socially influenced CRM deficiency and their social difficulty in pointing out mistakes of a superior, which is an essential aspect of cockpit communication.
It a similar problem that you'll see at many airlines that have all or mostly Airbus equipment. The pilots develop the mindset of system monitors and forget to be pilots.
The Airbus is built more for automation and system monitors. Even Boeings come with lots of automation. Automation is good when you need it (eg at cruising altitude or landing in conditions) but the cockpit is built for flying.
The Airbus is built with a different philosophy. While the planes are sturdy (with possible exception of the A300), their cockpits come with joysticks rather than yokes. That shows the lower priority that Airbus engineers give to piloting (vs systems monitoring).
I still think it would be great for Korean pilots to take a few weeks (paid by their company or on their own dime) to travel to US and hand fly small C172s without any glass. Actually learning real piloting would do wonders for their situational awareness in unexpected circumstances, where the pilot's ability to think clearly will be most important.
The French AirFrance 447 pilot would not have stalled his plane from all the way from FL350 into the ocean, if he were a pilot and not just a systems monitor. A bunch of real stall exercises in a Cessna with just him and an instructor would've given him the confidence to take more appropriate action the airliner.
If the Korean pilots of Asiana 214 regurly hand flew planes (no matter if Cessnas, 777s, or A320), they would've have forgotten to monitor airspeed and altitude on final.
Piloting skills ate still important for pilots. not in spite of automation but because of it. Automation is great but not perfect. When something goes wrong, I want pilots in the front that know more than plane and who have better cognitive skills than the plane and have better flying skills than the plane.
But my question is not answered and hence my doubt remains.
1. Asiana 214 flight is a daily flight and deploys B-777 every time. Right? Wrong?
2. As a standard routine, every pilot of every Asiana 214 flight knows the status of ILS at SFO well BEFORE departing from Seoul(Incheon Intn'l) for SFO. Right? Wrong?
3. Till noon of 5th July and since the time ILS at SFO got under repair, the Korean pilots of Asiana were landing theirs birds safely, whether under protest or not. Right? Wrong?
4. All pilots of Asiana supposedly follow the same operational and professional ethics guided by common organisational culture. Right? Wrong?
5. All students of the same institution, same class, same subject taught by same teacher perform differently. In class, in profession. Right? Wrong?
6. So if one or some specific persons fail to perform, the blame wrests squarely on the defaulting persons. And not on the whole class/group or teacher or the Institution. Right? Wrong?
1. Asiana 214 flight is a daily flight and deploys B-777 every time. Right? Wrong?
2. As a standard routine, every pilot of every Asiana 214 flight knows the status of ILS at SFO well BEFORE departing from Seoul(Incheon Intn'l) for SFO. Right? Wrong?
3. Till noon of 5th July and since the time ILS at SFO got under repair, the Korean pilots of Asiana were landing theirs birds safely, whether under protest or not. Right? Wrong?
4. All pilots of Asiana supposedly follow the same operational and professional ethics guided by common organisational culture. Right? Wrong?
5. All students of the same institution, same class, same subject taught by same teacher perform differently. In class, in profession. Right? Wrong?
6. So if one or some specific persons fail to perform, the blame wrests squarely on the defaulting persons. And not on the whole class/group or teacher or the Institution. Right? Wrong?
I answered your question directly above.
The proficiency in flying manual (or lack thereof) in endemic in that institution and the other national airline of the subject country. They just give it little priority.
The only difference is that these pilots' troubles resulted in a crash and some other didn't. Bi OT could've easily been reversed. Some other crew could've just barely crashed and this crew could've just barely made it.
Call it luck of the draw. These guys are probably not substantially worse than their colleagues, nor their colleagues substantially worse.
The failure happened in the space of 15-30 seconds. If they had only noticed as few as 5-10 seconds sooner they would've been able tonpull the plane out and tried again or been able to land uneventfully. Some other crew could've been lucky to have noticed only a few seconds earlier. But it could've been easily reversed.
Clearly the training in inadequate.
The very first words out of the CEO's mouth: nothing wrong with plane, we're going to improve training.
I'm sure this issue was widely known by the executives in charge of the airline (eg CEO, Chief Pilot, etc.) They may have wondered how significant an issue it was. The crash answered any lingering questions about the seriousness.
I would expect that they are working behind closed doors (not only at Asiana but only Korean Air) to prevent such an incident in the future. I can't guarded that their fix will be adequate. But it is clear that they wouldn't want a repeat.
They have 2 significant issues to deal with:
1) manual piloting skills
2) CRM in the cockpit
This is true irrespective of the specific findings of this crash. The crash only highlighted issues that were there, and will continue to be there until the airline takes specifics steps to overcome these deficiencies.
There have been improvements over the years. Just not enough. We can't wait for another crash before they correct the deficiencies.
Wayne is doubtful they'll get it right. This crash is supportive evidence of them not getting it right despite much outside consultative effort to correct these known deficiencies.
I'm hoping Wayne's wrong.
An airline's star pilots can't be crashing perfectly good airliners in perfect weather. They were both instructor pilots. One an instructor on 777. The other had been an instructor on the A320.
That this happened to their best is instructive about the seriousness of the underlying issue.
The proficiency in flying manual (or lack thereof) in endemic in that institution and the other national airline of the subject country. They just give it little priority.
The only difference is that these pilots' troubles resulted in a crash and some other didn't. Bi OT could've easily been reversed. Some other crew could've just barely crashed and this crew could've just barely made it.
Call it luck of the draw. These guys are probably not substantially worse than their colleagues, nor their colleagues substantially worse.
The failure happened in the space of 15-30 seconds. If they had only noticed as few as 5-10 seconds sooner they would've been able tonpull the plane out and tried again or been able to land uneventfully. Some other crew could've been lucky to have noticed only a few seconds earlier. But it could've been easily reversed.
Clearly the training in inadequate.
The very first words out of the CEO's mouth: nothing wrong with plane, we're going to improve training.
I'm sure this issue was widely known by the executives in charge of the airline (eg CEO, Chief Pilot, etc.) They may have wondered how significant an issue it was. The crash answered any lingering questions about the seriousness.
I would expect that they are working behind closed doors (not only at Asiana but only Korean Air) to prevent such an incident in the future. I can't guarded that their fix will be adequate. But it is clear that they wouldn't want a repeat.
They have 2 significant issues to deal with:
1) manual piloting skills
2) CRM in the cockpit
This is true irrespective of the specific findings of this crash. The crash only highlighted issues that were there, and will continue to be there until the airline takes specifics steps to overcome these deficiencies.
There have been improvements over the years. Just not enough. We can't wait for another crash before they correct the deficiencies.
Wayne is doubtful they'll get it right. This crash is supportive evidence of them not getting it right despite much outside consultative effort to correct these known deficiencies.
I'm hoping Wayne's wrong.
An airline's star pilots can't be crashing perfectly good airliners in perfect weather. They were both instructor pilots. One an instructor on 777. The other had been an instructor on the A320.
That this happened to their best is instructive about the seriousness of the underlying issue.
* These guys are probably not substantially worse than their colleagues, nor their colleagues substantially BETTER.
Throwing these guys under the bus won't fix any if the structural problems with their airline's training and pilot proficiency.
Don't get me wrong. I'm not saying these guys did not perform horribly. I'm saying their colleagues are likely not much different.
My main concern is to fix the problem an avoid safety issues in the future. Had been since day one.
Throwing these guys under the bus won't fix any if the structural problems with their airline's training and pilot proficiency.
Don't get me wrong. I'm not saying these guys did not perform horribly. I'm saying their colleagues are likely not much different.
My main concern is to fix the problem an avoid safety issues in the future. Had been since day one.
So you mean that ALL pilots of earlier Asiana 214 were as bad. Assuming ILS was bad since 30 days as on 6th July, so as many flights of Asiana 214 with a deployment of 10 to 15 different pilots on this route roaster, all are as incompetent. All previous flights landed safely because ALL 10-15 pilots were just lucky. A strongly biased remark!
Wait and watch, many pilots of previous flights will ALSO be called to depose before the Court to assess their perception during landing vis-a-vis the perception of the specific pilots during landing of the flight in question. This number can be a few of them on random selection basis to each one of them. If I were to be the Judge or defense Counsel, I shall call for ALL pilots for better and objective understanding.
And wait for Court's observation/verdict on this score.
Then I will ask you and your expert but similarly biased colleagues the SAME question. And your answer will be different though guarded, I am sure.
Please pardon my language if found lacking in softness!
Diplomatic language has never been my virtue.
Wait and watch, many pilots of previous flights will ALSO be called to depose before the Court to assess their perception during landing vis-a-vis the perception of the specific pilots during landing of the flight in question. This number can be a few of them on random selection basis to each one of them. If I were to be the Judge or defense Counsel, I shall call for ALL pilots for better and objective understanding.
And wait for Court's observation/verdict on this score.
Then I will ask you and your expert but similarly biased colleagues the SAME question. And your answer will be different though guarded, I am sure.
Please pardon my language if found lacking in softness!
Diplomatic language has never been my virtue.
The reality is that ONE flight crew failed to monitor airspeed and altitude on final approach resulting in the hull loss of the plane they were entrusted and many severe injuries and 3 deaths of their passengers. They must be responsible for their own performance. At the end if the day, no matter what institutionally deficient pilot training/ flying philosophy and culturally influenced CRM deficiencies that may be an issue to overcome for their organization, it was these specific individuals - the pilots at the command of this specific aircraft on this specific day and failed to bring her down safely and in one piece, despite it being a beautiful sunny day.
So there is no excuse for them. No matter the underlying contributing factors, they failed. Even if it could've easily been some other colleagues on a different day who crashed a plane in good weather instead, it was them who did.
So there is no excuse for them. No matter the underlying contributing factors, they failed. Even if it could've easily been some other colleagues on a different day who crashed a plane in good weather instead, it was them who did.
So while you seem stuck on determining culpability, I'm trying to parce out what happened and why, so that we can avoid a repeat.
But which crew crashed or not, doesn't inform who needs additional pilot training, and who needs to learn manual flying skills or reinforce the same. Other crews could be making the same or worse mistakes, but have been lucky in the timing.
I've mentioned above that the same crew (or another) might've accidently brought the plane down smoothly with the engines in idle had they started at 2400 at the outer marker instead of 2200 (actual) or 1800 (recommended). They would'vd made the same mistake and maybe not even notice. The landing could easily have been smooth as butter. No crash but SAME level of proficiency deficiency.
This same crew (or another) could been at specified 1800 altitude, and would've continued with the less steep recommended glide slope. In that case, they would've discovered their engine idling mistake much sooner. They would've added power, made corrections and landed, or gone around without incident.
So many pilots could "be afraid" of a routine manual landing on a sunny day, and make a small but crucial mistake. In many other scenarios, they would've had much tine to discover the mistake and recover from it.
On the day in question, since change in configuration was so late in the flight (literally the last minute of flight) they had limited time to correct any mistakes. As it is, it seems they did not notice the mistake until it was too late to recover.
But which crew crashed or not, doesn't inform who needs additional pilot training, and who needs to learn manual flying skills or reinforce the same. Other crews could be making the same or worse mistakes, but have been lucky in the timing.
I've mentioned above that the same crew (or another) might've accidently brought the plane down smoothly with the engines in idle had they started at 2400 at the outer marker instead of 2200 (actual) or 1800 (recommended). They would'vd made the same mistake and maybe not even notice. The landing could easily have been smooth as butter. No crash but SAME level of proficiency deficiency.
This same crew (or another) could been at specified 1800 altitude, and would've continued with the less steep recommended glide slope. In that case, they would've discovered their engine idling mistake much sooner. They would've added power, made corrections and landed, or gone around without incident.
So many pilots could "be afraid" of a routine manual landing on a sunny day, and make a small but crucial mistake. In many other scenarios, they would've had much tine to discover the mistake and recover from it.
On the day in question, since change in configuration was so late in the flight (literally the last minute of flight) they had limited time to correct any mistakes. As it is, it seems they did not notice the mistake until it was too late to recover.
My sincere gratitude for you tolerance. Also, for ONLY referring to these specific pilots in your blog.
Let me add and you will agree that as a routine some ATCs will also be investigated against. Those present during the landing of Asiana 214 on the fateful day and on other days.
Yes, as a routine the training system will be checked and there after the whole of CRM ! All this during investigation, and later in the Court. More thread bare than the proverbial 'birth day suit'.
So thanX for your patience and no more (counter) arguments by me.
Let me add and you will agree that as a routine some ATCs will also be investigated against. Those present during the landing of Asiana 214 on the fateful day and on other days.
Yes, as a routine the training system will be checked and there after the whole of CRM ! All this during investigation, and later in the Court. More thread bare than the proverbial 'birth day suit'.
So thanX for your patience and no more (counter) arguments by me.
The culpability is iron-clad, so there is no point to a dishonorable defense. Any defense that brings additional shame to colleagues and employing airline, will only magnify the shame of the flight crew, and show them to gave bad character.
So, let's start with the mistakes. There were several which combined to crash the plane, injure do many and kill three:
1. They failed to activate the auto-throttles (when disconnecting the auto-pilot.) they thought the auto-throttles were controlling airspeed.
1b. Or alternatively they failled to maintain the speed (either manually or through automation)
1c. This mistake happened no later than DUYET.
2. The next mistake is that they made a change to the approach configuration to adjust the level of descent late in flight (under 600ft, less than a minute of flight). The approach was unstable. Ideally you want your approach stabilized with a unchanging approach for a good distance so that you have time to make adjustments early, and have a stable unchanging approach that will bring the plane down right on the runway hash marks.
3. They failed to monitor airspeed and altitude on final approach. There was no other function in those last 2 minutes of approach (from 2200ft at DUYET to the crash at the seawall) that was more important than monitoring airspeed and altitude.
4. The plane wasn't lined up with the centerline of runway. With such light winds, this should've been easy. While this was not one of the three mistakes that directly caused the plane to crash in the wrong location, it may have been a distraction in the cockpit that took attention away from essential job responsibilities.
There is no way to excuse these fellows.
Culturally they may be expected to fall on their own sword, rather than bring additional shame to their colleagues and airline by mounting a dishonorable defense that throws their colleagues and airline under the bus. Doing so would only magnify their own shame.
You couldn't mount such a destructive defense without the permission of the defendants. I couldn't see them agreeing to do so. They would dishonor what is left of their name. Beyond making a mistake (anyone could make a mistake), they would've shown bad character to dishonor the friends and work colleagues. Suicide would be much preferable to that shameful defense.
Lastly, I suggest, if one is not stuck in the legalistic thinking, it frees up one's mind to find the best solution.
The problem is not that a plane crashed on a beautiful sunny day. The problem is that planes can crash still on beautiful sunny days.
The solution arises not from from assigning culpability to the flight crew (or not), but in figuring out the factors that contributed to the crash and that still contribute to the possibility of another crash in the future. Once identified, steps can be taken to rectify those.
Note that I am silent on the issue of punishment. Some make a case for. String them up so that future pilots will be more careful. Some make a case against. Full cooperation aids in the understanding of the incident.
So, let's start with the mistakes. There were several which combined to crash the plane, injure do many and kill three:
1. They failed to activate the auto-throttles (when disconnecting the auto-pilot.) they thought the auto-throttles were controlling airspeed.
1b. Or alternatively they failled to maintain the speed (either manually or through automation)
1c. This mistake happened no later than DUYET.
2. The next mistake is that they made a change to the approach configuration to adjust the level of descent late in flight (under 600ft, less than a minute of flight). The approach was unstable. Ideally you want your approach stabilized with a unchanging approach for a good distance so that you have time to make adjustments early, and have a stable unchanging approach that will bring the plane down right on the runway hash marks.
3. They failed to monitor airspeed and altitude on final approach. There was no other function in those last 2 minutes of approach (from 2200ft at DUYET to the crash at the seawall) that was more important than monitoring airspeed and altitude.
4. The plane wasn't lined up with the centerline of runway. With such light winds, this should've been easy. While this was not one of the three mistakes that directly caused the plane to crash in the wrong location, it may have been a distraction in the cockpit that took attention away from essential job responsibilities.
There is no way to excuse these fellows.
Culturally they may be expected to fall on their own sword, rather than bring additional shame to their colleagues and airline by mounting a dishonorable defense that throws their colleagues and airline under the bus. Doing so would only magnify their own shame.
You couldn't mount such a destructive defense without the permission of the defendants. I couldn't see them agreeing to do so. They would dishonor what is left of their name. Beyond making a mistake (anyone could make a mistake), they would've shown bad character to dishonor the friends and work colleagues. Suicide would be much preferable to that shameful defense.
Lastly, I suggest, if one is not stuck in the legalistic thinking, it frees up one's mind to find the best solution.
The problem is not that a plane crashed on a beautiful sunny day. The problem is that planes can crash still on beautiful sunny days.
The solution arises not from from assigning culpability to the flight crew (or not), but in figuring out the factors that contributed to the crash and that still contribute to the possibility of another crash in the future. Once identified, steps can be taken to rectify those.
Note that I am silent on the issue of punishment. Some make a case for. String them up so that future pilots will be more careful. Some make a case against. Full cooperation aids in the understanding of the incident.
So the question is not whether there is pilot training, but what is being taught specifically and differing philosophies on aircraft piloting in general. For example there is a debate about whether pilots should need to have manual flying skills or whether they should just be better systems managers. Some piloting philosophies believe that automation is better at piloting planes than humans so it leads to teaching different skills than under a philosophy of the human piloting the plane with automation as a tool available for certain operations.
So you first have to get the pilots and their trainers to agree that being able to pilot a plane by hand is important. Whether in the case of automation failure, or to have situational awareness to not let the automation crash the plane and/or not crash the plane when the plane feedback goes against basic piloting fundamentals.