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Ethiopian Airlines flight’s stall-prevention software was active at crash, CEO says
The chief executive of Ethiopian Airlines told the Wall Street Journal in an interview published today that he had reason to believe that software intended to prevent Boeing 737 MAX aircraft from stalling in flight had been activated aboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 shortly before its crash. CEO Tewolde Gebremariam said that “to the best of our knowledge,” the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) for stall prevention was active at the time of the crash. (arstechnica.com) Mehr...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
exactly, worst of all the control surface moved by MCAS is twice the size of the one operated by the pilot, guess who wins.
People been trying to build idiot proof airplanes since the Wright brothers. You learn about stalls from day one of flight training. Flying Rube Goldberg machines aren't the answer. Practice practice practice is. Just like how you get to Carnegie Hall.
Blame the automation, blame the crew, just like in politics people pick a side and go all in, reality be damned. These accidents are entirely typical real-world aviation accidents....the cause was a confluence of factors. The automation folks should have thought a little deeper into the “what if” tree and the crew should have been able to recognize runaway trim (howcome those big wheels next to my leg are spinning like that?).
What makes this one so riveting are the ancillary factors, particularly the Lion Air. How could the crew have been seemingly unaware of the problem after all the publicity over the first one and the fact the aircraft they were flying was known to have not only experienced the problem on its last flight bur it’s crew on that run was saved from the same fate only because a deadheading jump seater said something like “Ah, why don’t you turn off the trim so it will stop doing that?”
What makes this one so riveting are the ancillary factors, particularly the Lion Air. How could the crew have been seemingly unaware of the problem after all the publicity over the first one and the fact the aircraft they were flying was known to have not only experienced the problem on its last flight bur it’s crew on that run was saved from the same fate only because a deadheading jump seater said something like “Ah, why don’t you turn off the trim so it will stop doing that?”
DAMMIT JIM! If there were just a way to turn it off! Oh, there IS a way. It’s called the “Trim Cut Out Switch”!
Boeing must explain why the 737 Max cannot be certified without the MCAS system or I will never board it. This system is either required or not, if it is required to prevent a stall and you weaken it now does it mean that aircraft will be allowed to stall, this is getting confusing.
You will have to get off of most commercial airplanes. They are all certified with systems that enhance flight characteristics and which attempt to prevent pilots from losing control of the aircraft. Every jet in existence has had systems such as these. The 707 had a Yaw damper to prevent pilots from losing control due to “Dutch Roll”. The DC-9/MD80 and most T-tailed airplanes had hydraulic boost to prevent deep stalls and all have stick shakers and/or pushers to prevent stalls and stick PULLERS to prevent “Mach Tuck”. But there is no system to protect against really stupid pilots determined to stall an airplane. There’s fool proof but nothing’s PILOT proof. Asiana and Colgan Air proved that.
I have flown most of the airplanes you mention and many more, there is a difference between a yaw damper, stick shaker or pusher and a 737 Max that has a computer operated control system that has more authority than the pilot. MCAS actuates a larger control surface (horizontal stabilizer) than the pilot uses (elevator), to control the nose up or down. As we have seen twice now for whatever reason the MCAS system decides to push the nose down there is nothing the pilot can do except disengage it. The stabilizer brake from previous models has been removed for some unknown reason and makes it more difficult for the pilot to intervene. As said previously if such a system is required for an airplane to be in the air it shows a poor design that makes it vulnerable to stall, and failure of the very system that is there to help can be catastrophic. The design and need for this MCAS should be re-certified from scratch.
Does that make sense?