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  • 69

FAA Grounds All Cirrus Vision Jets over Angle of Attack Issues

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The FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive that grounds the Cirrus SF50 Vision Jet due to issues with the airplane's angle-of-attack and stall protection systems. (www.flyingmag.com) Mehr...

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737man
737man 14
Guess the 737 MAX isn't the only victim
jhakunti
Jayden Hakunti 13
Why do planes need a computer to operate the aircraft's flight controls in a stall?
ffrcobra1
ffrcobra1 28
They’re not designed to control the pitch axis in a stall. They’re suppose to announce an impending stall with the shaker and if you continue to approach the stall, the pusher will push the nose down BEFORE the wing actually stalls. Planes have had AOAs and stall computers since at least the 1960s. They work very reliably. In 30+ years working on Lears, I don’t recall ever getting a squawk from a pilot about the shaker or pusher activating in normal flight. They get out of cal and need adjustment, but they don’t just go crazy and try to kill people. I suspect that in an attempt to make the systems “better”, engineers have made the systems more complicated by feeding the computer data about airspeed, engine power setting, trim position and who knows what else. The more complicated things are the more things that can go wrong.
Highflyer1950
Highflyer1950 5
Well said. Airbus had the same issues on the A330 and A 320 series aircraft. Rather then teach the pilot how to recognize and recover they tried to turn pilots into button pushers and allowed the aircraft sensors to identify issues and resolve them via computer programming laws. Auto switching is fine for electrical systems/sources or fail-safe autopilots in Cat 11, Cat111 & Cat111a approaches but there was nothing wrong with the stick shaker, Stick pusher and for some of us lucky Lear folks (the stick puller). To design a system like the MCAS that the pilot cannot easily override with muscle is placing far too much emphasis on automation and not enough attention to the what if scenario!
wingbolt
wingbolt -1
The target audience for the Cirrus Jet was the Cirrus SR 20 and 22 owner. They setup their own school with their own instructors and simulators. It’s my understanding they also have their approved insurance underwriter. Certainly not pilots used to moderately performing aircraft with AOAs. Cirrus was trying to protect themselves from the lower experienced of the pilot pool and make it as idiot proof as possible.

The whole thing is a bit of a sham. The second version was able to be certified for RVSM airspace with only 1 altimeter displayed during flight in RVSM airspace with a idiot lite for altimeter mis-compare. It looks like the FAA might have looked the other way on this whole project.

This will probably only be the beginning of the problems for the “Collision” Jet.
bentwing60
bentwing60 -7
Well said! And how much admission from Boeing that they committed an egregious error that was revealed by errors committed by pilots that were not up to snuff when the s94t hits the fan is enough? The mulehead report comes to mind!
paulgilpin1953
paul gilpin 1
see if you can guess who you are in this video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T2NsTi_43g4
KenWD0ELQ
Ken Mitchell 12
Because software engineers who aren't pilots (but who DID play FlightSimulator as kids!) are EVER so much more capable than mere pilots who couldn't even code a "Hello World" statement in C#.

https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer
Highflyer1950
Highflyer1950 2
csc hello.cs
bentwing60
bentwing60 0
Wow, a poignant statement without the sarc. font that will elude half the crowd. If a 172 pilot who happens to be a successful coder didn't make so many factual errors in his diatribe, nee, elevator trim, ad. infinitum It still wouldn't matter to some pros.

you already posted the link.
rds24a
Richard Sucher 6
There was a time when safety systems were designed to ensure there were no "uncommanded" actions. Now it seems like the systems are designed to prevent "commanded" actions.

Statistics showed pilot error as the most common cause of accidents, so the reaction was to take the pilot out of the equation. Problem with that mindset is that the pilot errors were in a tiny fraction of flights. I doubt there are such clear and publicized statistics as to how many times pilot skill prevented an accident.
bbond
bradley bond 4
EVERY flight that arrives safely utilizes pilot skill to avoid an accident.
immermannjoseph
Joseph Immermann 4
AMEN brother! If I understand correctly, stall recovery instruction is, if not being discouraged, is not exactly being encouraged. This is appears to have been based on the fact that there have been a comparable number of stall instruction related accidents as to other flight involved stall related accidents. This tells me that we need to better instruct the instructors. Stalls must be experienced, if for no other reason than to take the OMG factor out of them. The best way to take the panic OMG factor out of stall response is to practice them. This will remove panic, but will also teach respect as the student pilot sees and feels what it takes to recover…something that might go a long way toward mitigating the proverbial departure stall while trying to return to the runway, which is almost invariably fatal. When flying solo I often practice stalls. I set 3,000 feet as a simulated hard deck so I have some safety room below but also so I should be below most cross-country traffic. I do a couple of clearing turns looking for traffic, and then I gradually pull power back while pulling gradual back pressure on the yoke until I fully stall. Yes, until I fully stall, not just until I hear the warning buzzer. I make certain I am ready with opposite rudder so I do not break too sharply to one side or the other, and I push power back in as I let the nose drop just enough to start regaining airspeed. Then I pull firm back pressure on the yoke to recover. When I am sloppy and out of practice I lose more altitude in the recovery, but with practice and experience in the C-172 I can recover in a couple hundred feet or less. I would happily go as far as to say that all pilots should have at least a couple hours of basic aerobatic instruction, too. It made a safer and more precise pilot out of me. (It was also FUN as HECK!!!) 
chrisrobey
CHRIS ROBEY 5
Right On Highflyer...
Highflyer1950
Highflyer1950 10
It’s bad enough when pilots these days can’t identify a stall/stall recovery when it happens, but now we have aircraft technology that tries to activate anti-stall devices when the damn thing is flying normally!

[This comment has been downvoted. Show anyway.]

Highflyer1950
Highflyer1950 5
About?
ids318
Ira Smith 3
As a frequent business traveler (Well over 1,500 flights) and aviation enthusiast, I really appreciate the FlightAware board. This particular discussion is one of the best I can remember in some time and speaks to all of the right issues: Culture, Mechanics, Safety, Technology and Automation. Let's hope that manufactures, regulators, instructors and pilots consider all of these issues when deciding what to build, approve and fly. Thanks to you all for a forum that allows a non-expert to learn and participate.
JohnTrolinger
John Trolinger 3
Well at least the chute didn't deploy.
bbabis
Bill Babis 1
Don't think that idea didn't cross their minds.
TerriAir
Thomas K Caudle 1
excellent action BY FAA
nasdisco
Chris B 1
Its all very interesting. Perhaps the regulators have to rely on manufacturers with these systems because they cannot verify them.
NF2G
David Stark 3
You might be on to something there.

Q: What is the difference between a lawyer and an engineer?

A: The engineer does not think he's a lawyer.
chrisrobey
CHRIS ROBEY 1
This may be slightly off topic but in the Lockheed Jetstar you had the facility to check each of the dual stick shakers and also each of the dual stick pushers individually. Just saying.
AaronAbasolo
David Stead 1
I see the AOA sensors on both the 737max and the Cirrus as having very small vanes, with little lever arm to overcome any stickiness in the mechanism. I remember long arms, resembling a weather vane, on older airliners; the longer lever arm on these older sensors may exhibit a bit more drag, but it seems to me that the long lever arm makes them less likely to get stuck. I'd live to hear the opinion of a mechanical engineer, especially one who has designed AOA sensors.
chrisrobey
CHRIS ROBEY 1
Good point that you raise David. Certainly also true for Lears and the Lockheed Jetstar Model 1329.

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