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What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447
Two years after the Airbus 330 plunged into the Atlantic Ocean, Air France 447's flight-data recorders finally turned up. The revelations from the pilot transcript paint a surprising picture of chaos in the cockpit, and confusion between the pilots that led to the crash. Read more: Air France 447 Flight-Data Recorder Transcript - What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447 - Popular Mechanics (www.popularmechanics.com) Mehr...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Somehow, thought of similar causes but did not want to name it.. However,Shocked!.. just Shocked!......
Scrap all Airbuses with the side stick and Buy BOEING with a control column !!!
Herb, thanks for your perspective on that. Probably calling the F/O flying
that 447 a "rookie" was careless of me. And I see your point that "pilot error" would cover a whole lot of crashes, even ones where equipment failed catastrophically.
Your comment earlier about the factories' initial Pitch to Eliminate the Training (and by consequence, The Thinking) was jarring. But have they even eliminated making a mantra of pushing the yoke forward when the airspeed drops drastically? I mean drilling it in so that it's reflexive, unless low altitude prohibits? Watered down that axiom to the point where the instinct to TOGA was stronger? Or was the classic response to a stall never drilled into young pilots that intensely?
I'd have to guess the answer is no, that pilots are still learning the instinct, and not just the theory, to nose-down in a stall, otherwise there would be a lot more 447s in the past decade or so. But it does make it harder to understand the F/O's response on the 447.
How did the airlines sell a gutting of training programs to the FAA? Seems like another ball dropped, but then that shouldn't surprise, right? Considering how long it seems to take the agency to put NTSB reccommendations into practice in other cases.
that 447 a "rookie" was careless of me. And I see your point that "pilot error" would cover a whole lot of crashes, even ones where equipment failed catastrophically.
Your comment earlier about the factories' initial Pitch to Eliminate the Training (and by consequence, The Thinking) was jarring. But have they even eliminated making a mantra of pushing the yoke forward when the airspeed drops drastically? I mean drilling it in so that it's reflexive, unless low altitude prohibits? Watered down that axiom to the point where the instinct to TOGA was stronger? Or was the classic response to a stall never drilled into young pilots that intensely?
I'd have to guess the answer is no, that pilots are still learning the instinct, and not just the theory, to nose-down in a stall, otherwise there would be a lot more 447s in the past decade or so. But it does make it harder to understand the F/O's response on the 447.
How did the airlines sell a gutting of training programs to the FAA? Seems like another ball dropped, but then that shouldn't surprise, right? Considering how long it seems to take the agency to put NTSB reccommendations into practice in other cases.
Not a pilot, but have studied aviation since I was a teenager. I'd be interested to know what some of you *real* pilots think of my take on the AB systems and this crash.
Obviously, the young pilot in the right-hand seat (PIC?) made an inexplicable and grievous error by pulling the stick back almost immediately after the AP disengaged. And then nailed it by never bringing it back to straight and level, but keeping back pressure on the stick except for one brief moment near the end.
So right there you could say the crash was due to human error, period. As others have said, absent this error these guys would have muddled through okay. Maybe I'm missing something.
But in more traditional AC systems, various posters have also noted that there are two or three features that would have probably caught this poor rookie's error.
Most notably, that in (almost?) every old-timey AC, including modern Boeings, the left and right yokes are linked and move simultaneously, which in this case would have allowed the left-hand pilot to notice what a crazy thing the other guy was doing with the elevators.
So in moving to a "smarter" flight deck system, AB actually eliminated at least one cross-check on human error. Almost as if the designers of the AB made the very glib assumption that we don't have to worry as much about human error because the computer is so good.
This is real disturbing, especially with the eventual trend towards pilotless flight decks. Even if those computer programmers are themselves pilots, they can't possibly think up every scenario. With a real human next to the throttles, at least there's a fair shot that the plane will make it home, even from that unanticipated scenario.
Obviously, the young pilot in the right-hand seat (PIC?) made an inexplicable and grievous error by pulling the stick back almost immediately after the AP disengaged. And then nailed it by never bringing it back to straight and level, but keeping back pressure on the stick except for one brief moment near the end.
So right there you could say the crash was due to human error, period. As others have said, absent this error these guys would have muddled through okay. Maybe I'm missing something.
But in more traditional AC systems, various posters have also noted that there are two or three features that would have probably caught this poor rookie's error.
Most notably, that in (almost?) every old-timey AC, including modern Boeings, the left and right yokes are linked and move simultaneously, which in this case would have allowed the left-hand pilot to notice what a crazy thing the other guy was doing with the elevators.
So in moving to a "smarter" flight deck system, AB actually eliminated at least one cross-check on human error. Almost as if the designers of the AB made the very glib assumption that we don't have to worry as much about human error because the computer is so good.
This is real disturbing, especially with the eventual trend towards pilotless flight decks. Even if those computer programmers are themselves pilots, they can't possibly think up every scenario. With a real human next to the throttles, at least there's a fair shot that the plane will make it home, even from that unanticipated scenario.
Spud, Pilot Error is a very convenient way for everyone to explain accidents. That way nobody gets sued.
I guess one could contend that, in any accident that could have been prevented by any action the Crew could have taken, Pilot Error was the cause. That's almost all of them.
These guys obviously weren't trained for this type of scenario. As I mentioned before, I never flew the 'Bus but even on the glass cockpit Boeings the training emphasis was definiely on How to Serve the FMS rather than how to fly the airplane. I think this might be a holdover from the early days of the computerized airplanes when the guys checking out on them knew how to fly but not how to use the new systems.
These F/O's were hardly Rookies. They were in their 30's with 3000+ hours. We have guys in their early twenties with under 500 hours flying Supersonic Fighters in dozens of countries. I was an Aircraft Commander flying C-130's all over the world at 26 with 1200 hours. The Training is what matters. As they say, some guys have 10,000 hours and others have the same 1000 hours ten times.
I completely agree with you about the idiocy of trying to design the Pilot out of the Control Loop. Not only does the Pilot have access to the information the FMS uses- pressures,temperatures,RPM's, etc.- but he can hear, feel, smell. The Magic Box should provide the Pilot with information and the Pilot should be trained on how to interpret and use this info. If the Pilot has to overstress the airplane to keep from hitting something, he needs to be able to do it. If the airplane is so bent that it has to be scrapped, the Junk Dealer is happy- but not as happy as the Crew and Pax.
I guess one could contend that, in any accident that could have been prevented by any action the Crew could have taken, Pilot Error was the cause. That's almost all of them.
These guys obviously weren't trained for this type of scenario. As I mentioned before, I never flew the 'Bus but even on the glass cockpit Boeings the training emphasis was definiely on How to Serve the FMS rather than how to fly the airplane. I think this might be a holdover from the early days of the computerized airplanes when the guys checking out on them knew how to fly but not how to use the new systems.
These F/O's were hardly Rookies. They were in their 30's with 3000+ hours. We have guys in their early twenties with under 500 hours flying Supersonic Fighters in dozens of countries. I was an Aircraft Commander flying C-130's all over the world at 26 with 1200 hours. The Training is what matters. As they say, some guys have 10,000 hours and others have the same 1000 hours ten times.
I completely agree with you about the idiocy of trying to design the Pilot out of the Control Loop. Not only does the Pilot have access to the information the FMS uses- pressures,temperatures,RPM's, etc.- but he can hear, feel, smell. The Magic Box should provide the Pilot with information and the Pilot should be trained on how to interpret and use this info. If the Pilot has to overstress the airplane to keep from hitting something, he needs to be able to do it. If the airplane is so bent that it has to be scrapped, the Junk Dealer is happy- but not as happy as the Crew and Pax.
Air France did not get the plane's pitot's fixed/replaced as Airbus recommended, correct?